🔗 Share this article

In early December, the U.S. President convened the leaders of Rwanda and the Democratic Republic of the Congo for a peace agreement. The commitment involved an end to long-standing fighting in the unstable eastern DRC, framing it as an opportunity for businesses in all three nations “to make a lot of money”.

Shortly after, however, a completely opposite method for violence emerged. Officials confirmed that U.S. forces had carried out Christmas Day airstrikes in north-west Nigeria, striking sites linked to the Islamic State (IS). In a social media post, the President warned, I had cautioned these Terrorists that if they did not stop the slaughtering of Christians, there would be hell to pay, and tonight, there was.”

A Defining Change of Direction

This dichotomy exemplifies the core feature of the U.S. approach to sub-Saharan Africa in this term: a moving away from advocating for democracy and human rights in favor of a declared focus on economic deals and ending wars—even as this fits with the emerging aerial operations in Nigeria remains to be seen.

“We no longer see Africa as a continent in need of handouts, but as a capable commercial partner. ‘Trade, not aid,’ a mantra commonly used for years, is now truly our policy for Africa,” said a high-ranking U.S. diplomat in a visit to Côte d’Ivoire in March.

A presidential spokesperson reinforced this, saying the President “has treated Africa not as a charity case, but as a powerhouse partner. Under his leadership, American investment, technology, and diplomacy are helping African nations achieve stability, build real energy independence, and turn their natural wealth into jobs and opportunity.”

Policy Impacts and Contradictions

This change is major, but analysts caution it is too soon to judge its results. The approach is influenced by the President’s direct manner, which has included disputes with long-standing U.S. partners and derogatory comments about Africans.

“The core tenet is, if it’s in the immediate or future interest of the United States, as I see it, then I’m going to do it,” explained a scholar for Africa studies at a influential foreign policy council.

Major actions have included:

• Dismantlement of the primary U.S. international development agency, USAID. A study forecasts this could lead to millions of additional deaths globally by 2030, with a sizable share in Africa.
• Enacting visa restrictions on citizens from more than two dozen African countries and halting most refugee admissions.
• Unleashing a global tariff campaign that has harmed African businesses dependent on U.S. markets, such as textile manufacturers in Lesotho.
• Letting a longstanding U.S.-Africa trade preference act, the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA), to lapse without renewal.

International Apathy and Friction

Unlike his recent predecessors, the President never visited sub-Saharan Africa during his first term. His most notable engagement with African affairs was referring to nations on the continent with a vulgar slur, which he later acknowledged using.

“Africa clearly runs dead bottom in his list of priorities, not just for him, but for the administration in general,” said the Africa program director for an international conflict resolution organization. He pointed to the recent U.S. National Security Strategy, which allocated only three paragraphs to Africa in a 29-page document.

A major disagreement has broken out with South Africa, apparently influenced by claims of persecution against the white minority. This led to a U.S. boycott of the G20 summit in Johannesburg and threats to block South African delegates from the next meeting.

“The claim of a ‘white genocide’ happening in South Africa aligns beautifully now with U.S. political culture and the idea that diversity is not welcome, it’s a threat,” commented a veteran South African journalist based in Washington.

Business-Like Relations and Targeted Involvement

A similar confrontation appeared with Nigeria in November, when the President threatened to cut aid and send in the military “guns-a-blazing” over the killing of Christians. This conflicted with Nigeria’s complex reality as a nation evenly divided between Christians and Muslims and plagued by security crises affecting both groups.

Some Nigerian analysts said that the harsh rhetoric may have pushed the government into greater action on security. After the Christmas airstrikes, Nigerian officials said they had authorized the U.S. intervention and might collaborate on further actions.

The President has made no secret his desire for a Nobel Peace Prize. His administration has brokered in the Congo conflict and dispatched a diplomat to try to forge a peace deal in Sudan’s civil war, to date without success. While the Congo deal was reportedly broken quickly, it “at least serves to introduce a degree of diplomacy and a channel outside the battlefield,” noted one conflict expert.

Similar to Competitors

Experts characterize the new U.S. approach as paralleling that of global rivals like Russia and China, who have expanded their involvement in Africa in recent decades based on strategic interests.

“It’s a long overdue recognition of African agency, and to that extent, it represents, at least at the level of symbols, taking Africa very seriously,” commented one foreign policy analyst.

Ultimately, the revised strategy likely means that “a nation that doesn’t have anything to put on the table … is not on his radar.”

“The diplomacy that we are talking about does not seek to spreading the milk of human kindness, as it were, it is about a quid-pro-quo posture towards Africa,” the journalist concluded.